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Chief Justice Weygandt, introducing Dean Pound:
Since tradition demands that everything uttered on an
occasion such as this be reduced to permanent form for preserva-
tion in what I once heard a Washington taxicab driver designate
as the "arshives," I read.
As Chief Justice of my state's court of dernier resort, I
accept as an honor the invitation to participate in the program
incident to the inauguration of a former member of that high
tribunal as the seventh president of one of those mighty insti-
tutions now carrying the burden of our great experiment known
as universal education.
In discharging my pleasant duty of presenting the first
speaker, it may not be inconsistent with the proprieties for me
to observe that in the colonies during the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury lawyers apparently were of little importance. To be a
lawyer was to incur social ostracism. In Connecticut they were
included in the discriminatory legislation of that day, and were
classed with keepers of brothels. Rhode Island excluded them
from membership in the legislature. In 1730 the number
allowed to practice in the courts of New York was limited to
eight, although there were thirty practicing in that city-many
of extremely bad reputation. However, during the latter part
of that century their rise was rapid and was due probably to the
development of business on a larger, intercolonial scale, and
to the increased number of legal problems incident to the
approach of the Revolutionary War. By the time the early
years of the nineteenth century were reached the law opened
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the surest way to reputation, influence and power, and it was
during this period in 1817 that Harvard Law School was
founded. Immediately thereafter the pulpit began to give way
to the bar, and the teaching of brimstone was partially super-
seded by the teaching of Blackstone. Thus was developed the
art of saying the ungracious thing in a gracious manner.
I am told that the early graduates of Harvard Law School
were responsible for the then ultra-modern negative pregnant
known as the itemization of services rendered by the lawyer to
his client. One of those early graduates, I am told, billed his
client in the following manner: "At home with my family
thinking, studying and scheming as to the manner and method
of avoiding your tax assessment, $5.00."
But generation after generation of Harvard Law School
graduates have made contributions of the highest order to our
national progress, and the school itself has been ever vigilant
and zealous in elevating the practice of the great profession of
the law.
It is sufficient to say that the distinguished gentleman to
address us at this time was for many years the dean of the
Harvard Law School and still is an active member of its faculty.
We welcome to Ohio this lawyer, scholar, educator and author,
Dean Roscoe Pound, whose subject is "The University and the
Legal Profession."
THE UNIVERSITY AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
The relation of the University to the legal profession must
be approached by way of the relation of the University to the
law as well as by way of its relation to law teaching. Law, law
teaching, and the legal profession are three things which have
grown up together. The University can do more for the law
than merely teach it in the grand style. The law school of a
state university can do much of the work of a ministry of justice
for the state by the study of the problems of administering
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justice in the jurisdiction and its ability to bring to bear upon
them its resources in the learning and research of its teachers
in the social sciences in addition to the learning and experience
and training in research of its faculty of law. It can do more
for law teaching than merely impart a sound professional train-
ing. It can train lawyers who will not only be competent ad-
visers useful to their clients and helpful to the courts, it can
train lawyers who as legislators, as critics of public affairs, and
as intelligent guides to public opinion in a polity like ours, in
which political questions are so often legal and so many legal
questions are political, will be public spirited and useful citizens.
It can do more for the profession than what I have pointed out
as its task for the law and for law teaching. It can develop the
professional spirit in those who go to the practice of law from
its teaching and thus foster what is not the least feature of an
effective administration of justice according to law.
Plato tells us that, of all kinds of knowledge, the knowledge
of good laws may do most for the learner. A deep study of
the science of law, he adds, may do more than all other writing
to give soundness to our judgment and stability to the state.
Indeed, he goes so far as to claim for it that it will confirm and
advance the good in their goodness and reclaim the bad, except
that incorrigible remnant for whom he conceives there is no
help short of the gallows. It is true that this high estimate of
the study of law has two presuppositions that must give us
pause. For one thing, the philosopher was thinking and writing
of study of an ideal body of laws devised for an ideal social and
political order, not of study of the code of legal precepts that
happens to obtain at a given time in a given state. For another
thing, he writes under the influence of the Socratic identification
of wickedness with ignorance and the belief that when men are
well informed as to the right they will not go wrong. Thus it
might be questioned whether the study of law in a professional
school is the same thing as that study of laws which Plato com-
mends so highly. Also it is not so clear to us today that we may
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combat evil with mere learning. With full allowance for this
last consideration, however, we still have warrant for high
claims for study of the science of law.
But, some one will say, is it a science of law that you study
in the professional school of today? You study the Anglo-
American common law. You study that common law in its
practical application as set forth in the reported decisions of the
courts. You investigate, not the principles of justice nor the
ideal of the social and legal order, but the recorded experiences
of the administration of justice among English-speaking
peoples. You study these materials in order to train lawyers
for the practice of their profession. How are these things to
achieve even a large measure of what Plato expected from the
science of law?
Plato called for knowledge of good laws and for deep study
of the science of law. We set up law schools to teach "law."
But are these the same? Does "law" include "good laws"?
Does the teaching of "law" involve deep study of the science
of law? What is "law"?
To the lay mind the answer is simple: Law is an aggregate
of laws, and laws are rules. Law is the whole body of legal
precepts that obtain in the time and place. Indeed, some jurists
have acceded to this lay view of the matter, and the analytical
school, which was conspicuous in England and America in the
last century, took this for its fundamental position. It held that
lawyers were concerned only with the precepts which the state
established, or which the state recognized and enforced through
its tribunals. With the goodness or badness of these precepts
lawyers had nothing to do. Nor was the science of law to go
beyond an ordering and systematizing of these precepts. If this
is the sound theory of law, and the true conception of the science
of law, certainly it is not the good law and the science of law
of which Plato wrote. Moreover, if such is to be our conception,
we may well inquire whether there is much warrant for an
academic school of law. We may well ask whether the aggregate
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of legal precepts applied for the time being in the particular
place needs to be taught academically-whether it is not the
best and the simplest course to learn them in the office of the
practitioner, as was formerly the custom. We may well ask,
even if it be thought that these precepts may be taught best in a
school, whether it is worth while to devote large endowments
and set up expensive university schools to teach a set of precents
that may be repealed by the next legislature.
In truth, the matter is by no means as simple as the common
sense of the layman or the dogmatism of the analytical jurist
make it appear. There is much more in law than a mere aggre-
gate of legal precepts. Legal precepts are something much
more complicated than the baseball rules or the football rules,
or the constitutions and by-laws of dubs and fraternal orders,
or the army regulations, or even than the municipal penal
ordinances. Good laws in the sense of ideals are a large element
in the apparatus by which causes are decided every day in the
tribunals, and the science of law must take account of this
element if it is to give us a true picture of the legal precepts
that obtain for the moment. Likewise the science of law must
do more than arrange and systematize those precepts. It must
investigate the way they are given shape and are eked out and
are developed with reference to ideals and by means of a
juristic and judicial technique. It must investigate the means
by which abstract formulas are made into living instruments
of justice in their interpretation and application. Such a science
of law may indeed give soundness to our judgment and stability
to the state. It is no less a science that is taught in the American
law school.
Three elements go to make up the law. The first element
is legal precepts, the element to which Bentham referred when
he said that law was an aggregate of laws. The second element
is a traditional technique of deciding cases; a technique of
finding the grounds of decision in legislation supplemented by
traditional legal materials, or, in the absence of legislation, on
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the basis of traditional materials alone; a technique of develop-
ing and applying legal precepts whereby those precepts are
supplemented, extended, restricted, and thus adapted to the
administration of justice. The third element is a body of ideas
as to the end or purpose of law and as to what legal precepts
ought to be in view thereof, an ideal picture of the social order
with consequent pictures of the details of the legal ordering of
society, with reference to which legal precepts and the tradi-
tional technique of decision are developed and applied and are
continually given new shape or new content or new application
in the changing circumstances of life.
No one questions that legal precepts are law. But if we
mean by law that body of materials by means of which the courts
decide the controversies that come before them, legal precepts
are not all of the law. Indeed, it is impossible for them to be
all of the law. Human wisdom does not suffice to provide a
complete and perfect body of precepts for which no supplement
and no gloss will be needed, and in which every human contro-
versy can find its exact preappointed solution. No matter what
the legal precepts may be for the time being, no matter what
the last legislature may have prescribed or the justices of the
highest appellate tribunal may have announced in the last lot
of opinions handed down, interpretations and distinctions and
analogical extensions and logical inferences and equitable appli-
cations will be called for by the infinite variety of human life
to which the precepts must be applied. The precepts, the
statutes, the judicial opinions will prove to be but materials
from which tribunals must construct grounds of decision for
states of fact which those who formulated the precepts, those
who drew the statutes, those who wrote the opinions had never
been called upon to consider. They are able to do this because
of a certain judicial and juristic craftsmanship, because of a
traditional technique, because of habits of mind which are the
most enduring features of a legal system.
By way of example, consider four settled habits of mind of
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the common-law lawyer-his attitude as to the force to be given
to judicial decisions, his attitude toward specific redress and sub-
stituted redress, his attitude toward legislation, and his tendency
to think in terms of relations. As a matter of course he attributes
to judicial decision a controlling force in the decision of sub-
sequent cases. As a matter of course he regards substituted
redress as the normal type and specific redress as something
exceptional, reserved for cases for which substituted redress
is not adequate. As a matter of course he regards a statutory
rule as something introduced specially into the general body
of the common law, without any necessary or systematic rela-
tion thereto, in order to govern same special situation, and hence
governing that situation only. As a matter of course he thinks in
terms of relation-of husband and wife, landlord and tenant,
master and servant, principal and agent, principal and surety,
vendor and purchaser. So completely do these mental habits
shape his legal thinking that he is at a loss to understand how
the lawyers of half the world can think in radically different
fashion upon each point. The civil-law lawyer finds his common
law in texts and conceives of a judicial decision as determining
nothing beyond the case in which it was rendered. He thinks of
specific redress as normal and substituted redress as exceptional.
He reasons by analogy from legislative texts and confines the
force of a settled line of adjudication to the exact proposition
it establishes. He thinks of will, where we think of relation,
and speaks of the law of persons or family law, of usufruct, of
the contract of letting services, of the contract of mandate, of
the contract of suretyship, and of the contract of sale. We have
a traditional technique of deciding with reference to the judicial
decisions of the past, a traditional technique of developing the
grounds of decision of particular cases on the basis of reported
judicial experience. The civilian has a traditional technique of
construing legal texts, and a traditional technique of developing
the grounds of decision therefrom. In each case the art of
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working with legal precepts is more significant than the details
of the legal precepts themselves.
But the administration of justice involves more than the
interpreting and applying of given precepts by means of a tra-
ditional technique. It happens continually that courts must
choose between competing principles, developing the one and
distinguishing the other. They must choose to apply this
precept by analogy and thus to extend its scope, and to restrict
that precept that might well cover the case. They must choose
to go in. one path of legal analogy and not in another, where
both lie open before them. The choice is not one of inexorable
logic. Nor is it a matter of mere personal inclination or personal
caprice. It is governed by settled ideals of the end of law and of
what the legal order, and hence what legal precepts, should be
in view thereof. These ideals give the background upon which
judicial decision and juristic writing are projected. They deter-
mine the choice of starting points for judicial and juristic reason-
ing, the choice of analogies, and the selection of the concrete
materials with which to fill out abstract formulas. Consider the
test of applicability to American conditions that played a deter-
mining part in the formative period of American common law.
How did courts ascertain what was applicable and what was not?
There were no precepts defining applicability. The phrase had
no historical content. They could only refer to an idealized
picture of pioneer, rural, agricultural America of the fore part
of the nineteenth century. That picture became part of the law.
Other such pictures may be seen in connection with the criteria
of conformity to "the nature of free government" or conformity
to the "nature of American government" or to the "nature of
American institutions," which have served as the basis of so
many decisions on constitutional law; in connection with the
hypothetical "old law of England," that idealization of parts
of the medieval law to which so many things were referred a
generation ago; and in connection with "the common law as it
was at the time of colonization," an idealization of seventeenth-
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century law in terms and for purposes of the present, which
still serves as the basis of decision in more than one of our
commonwealths.
Nor are the legal precepts that make up the first and most
obvious element of the law merely a body of simple commands
and prohibitions. There are, indeed, many rules-many pre-
cepts in which a definite detailed legal consequence is attached
to a definite detailed state of facts. But the lawyer knows well
that he may seldom expect to find such a rule precisely appli-
cable to his problem. Often he can hope only to find a principle
-a generalization giving an authoritative premise for judicial
and juristic reasoning. Often he must turn to some legal con-
ception-to some critically defined type of situation to which he
may refer or by which he may measure the facts of the case
before him and thus find a basis for legal reasoning. Often
there is no more than a standard-a general measure of conduct
to be applied with reference to the circumstances of each case
with wide margins of application and an ultimate reference to
what is fair and reasonable on the particular facts.
Thus rules are no more than a small fraction of the whole
that we call law. Often they are the least stable part of the law.
In a large view they are the least significant part. If one doubt
this, let him compare the rules of i8oo with those of 1830, of
I86o, of i89o , and of today. Where is the learning of real
actions of i8oo? Where are the nice rules of common-law
pleading of 1830? Where are the pedantic distinctions of bail-
ments that obtained in 18 6o, or the minute precepts as to appel-
late procedure and error in trials at law that were at the height
of their vogue in 189o Yet how stable have principles and con-
ceptions proved in comparison. If our law schools taught rules
only, their teaching would be built upon the sand. It is because
they must teach and do teach principles and conceptions and how
to use them, standards and how to apply them, the traditional
technique of the lawyers' and judges' craft, and the traditional
ideals of what law is and what it is for-it is for these reasons
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that we may assert for the law school what Plato claimed for the
study of law. When we train common-law lawyers, i.e.,
lawyers bred in the traditional art of decision that has grown up
among English-speaking peoples, we give soundness to judg-
ment and stability to the state. For our Anglo-American polity
is a legal polity and our political institutions are legal institu-
tions. But we seek to make common-law lawyers in whose hands
the tradition shall further the progress of civilization. We seek
to train common-law lawyers in whose hands the traditional
Anglo-American technique of working out the grounds of deci-
sion from the judicial experience of the past shall continue to
be an instrument of justice. In Plato's phrase, we seek to trans-
mit a knowledge of good laws.
Although legal precepts in the narrowest sense, i.e., rules
attaching a definite detailed legal consequence to a definite
detailed state of facts, are the staple of ancient codes, it is not
true, even in the beginnings of law, that the law is a mere body
of legal precepts. In the beginning law is scarcely set off from
other forms of social control. There is an undifferentiated social
control by religion, ethical custom, and enacted rules. Hence
knowledge of the traditional religious precepts and of the tra-
ditionally established ethical custom, as well as knowledge of the
traditional interpretation of the written law, is even more im-
portant for the administration of justice than knowledge of the
precepts promulgated in the code. Thus legal education is as
old as law. For although the promulgated precepts are written
out for all to read, the tradition must be transmitted through
some sort of instruction. With the evolution of the legal order
and development of the elaborate systems of the maturity of
law, the relative significance of authoritatively established rules
becomes even less and the demand for legal education contin-
ually increases.
In the modern world, legal education takes three forms:
The Continental academic type, running back to legal education
in ancient Rome; the English apprentice type, going back to the
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medieval conception of the profession as analogous to a craft,
with its own government, it own traditional art or mystery,
and its own instruction by the neophyte's serving as apprentice
to a master; and the American academic professional type,
growing out of the inapplicability of the English type to the
conditions of the formative period of American law and the
need of a rapid working over and adaptation of seventeenth-
century English law in order to make of it a common law for
America.
In the beginning of Roman law, the little differentiated or
undifferentiated body of religious precepts, ethical custom, and
legal rules, by which the social order was maintained, was a
tradition of the pontifices. Except as codified by the Twelve
Tables, down to the fourth century B.C. this tradition was
possessed exclusively by the patricians, who alone were eligible
to the priesthood. The great man who knew the tradition sat
in the court of his house and advised his dependents, drew legal
documents for them, and, if need was, conducted causes for
them. A turning point in legal history is the secularization of
the law, which took place at Rome at the opening of the fourth
century B.C. As a part of this process of secularization, the first
plebeian pontifex naximus began to give consultations in public,
so that students could listen and take notes. Also those who
knew the law began to give advice to all comers, and had
hearers, as they were called, who attended the consultations,
learned the tradition and the traditional art, and in time, when
they had become learned in the law, might themselves sit and
give counsel. Thus in place of the priestly caste who have a class
monopoly of the tradition, we get a profession with a sort of
professional monopoly. When, in the reign of Augustus, the
jurisconsults come to be licensed by the emperor, the transition
is complete. At least as far back as the reign of Augustus we
find that the jurisconsult is both counsellor and teacher, and this
double function continues through the classical period. Not only
do students attend consultations and take notes but the juris-
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consult lectures to them and even writes institutional treatises
for them. Moreover, there is evidence that there were teachers
of law in the classical period who were not practitioners.
Law schools as such developed in the period of maturity of
law. The school of most importance was at Berytus, which in
the fifth century was the chief seat of legal learning. The
teachers of law in this school were men of culture, learned in
the classical law, and possessed of an academic legal science
only just short of the practical legal science of the classical jur-
ists. From their time to the present, the academic law school
has been the chiefest factor in the development of Roman law.
Their notes upon the classical texts, editing them and bringing
them down to date as statements of the actual law, as well as
interpreting them and putting their details into a harmonious,
logically constructed system, prepared the way for Justinian's
Digest, which is the common law of at least half of the world
today.
There is evidence of a continuity of law teaching in Italy
from the law schools of Justinian's time to the rise of the great
medieval teachers of law at Bologna in the twelfth century.
Thus in a sense the methods of the school at Berytus set the
standard for teaching of Roman law for the modern world. But
beyond this, the conditions of teaching at fifth century Berytus
and in twelfth century Italy were the same. In the maturity of
law in the ancient world, the writing of the chief jurisconsults
of the classical era had been given statutory authority. Hence
the task of the teacher was to interpret and expound these texts
of the second and third centuries as a living body of law for the
fifth and sixth centuries. In the same way in twelfth-century
Italy the task was to interpret and expound the codification of
Rofnan law by Justinian in the sixth century as a universal law
of Christendom six centuries later. Thus from the beginning
legal education in the modern Roman law was a training in the
interpretation and application of written texts.
To understand the academic juristic method of the medieval
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Roman law, we must remember that medieval thought assumed
the existence of a universal Christian society, which on its
temporal side was a continuation of the ancient Roman empire.
Postulating the continuity of the empire, the Corpus Juris was
authoritative legislation binding upon the empire over which
Justinian had ruled. It was an age of authority. Hence all that
seemed permissible was analysis of the text and interpretation.
Thinking of the Digest of Justinian as a statute and so of every
text as written at one time, the academic teachers sought by
means of analysis and formal logic to reconcile conflicting texts,
to develop the implied content of each text, and to carry out
the content to all its logical conclusions. As academic teaching
of Roman law became the practical teaching of law for western
Europe, a great part of the work of the teachers was application
of the texts to hypothetical cases, leading to distinctions, analog-
ical extensions, and generalizations in the form of maxims. Thus
we get two characteristics of Roman-law teaching that persist
to this day. First, it is primarily a teaching of the art of using
authoritative texts as the basis for administering justice. Second,
it is an academic teaching upon the basis of purely hypothetical
cases and the opinions of the doctors as to the proper application
of the texts to these cases. In consequence, it has no immediate
relation to actual cases. It ignores judicial experience. It dis-
cusses opinions on the texts and academic solutions of hypo-
thetical cases, conceiving of the texts as laying down universal
propositions, raising universal questions, and to be interpreted
for all times, all places, and all men.
In the sixteenth century, the Humanists gave another direc-
tion to academic teaching of Roman law. The scholastic dialec-
tical apparatus of the commentators, well adapted to organize
any particular topic of the law, involved so diffuse and elaborate
an exposition that only a small portion of the law could be
treated in the reasonable limits of academic lectures. At most
the professor could expound a few texts during a term, and for
the rest the student must read by himself. The Humgnists
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began to work out a system of Roman law as a whole. They
engaged in a systematic exposition of the law derived from the
texts instead of an exposition of the texts in their own order.
Thus begins that search for a universal systematic arrangement,
that quest for an analytical scheme whereby the whole law may
be exhibited as a complete body of harmonious, logically inter-
dependent precepts, flowing logically from a small number
of established fundamental propositions, which has been char-
acteristic of civilian exposition of law ever since and has exercised
a profound influence upon systematic ideas in our own law.
After the Reformation and the consequent downfall of the
canon law as an everyday agency of social control, Roman law
was left in possession of the field as the one system of law with
claims to universality. But by this time the idea of the continuity
of the empire, and of the binding force of the Corpus Juris as
authoritative legislation for all Christendom had broken down.
It was apparent to jurists that they must find some test of the
authority of a legal precept, or of a juristic principle, other than
the text of the Corpus Juris. Accordingly lawyers began to
study the actual course of decision in the courts in order to
ascertain what parts of the Corpus Juris had been received as
customary law and what had not. Thus they worked out the
asas modernus pandectaritm as a recognized system. Meanwhile
the academic jurists sought to find a philosophical basis for the
reception of Roman law upon which to rest the authority of its
rules. This quest led them to adopt reason as the ultimate test
of the validity of a legal precept. The result was a liberal,
creative period, strikingly analogous to the classical period of
Roman law in the ancient world. But in large part they assumed
that the Roman law was embodied reason and reconciled author-
ity with their rationalist philosophy in this way.
At the end of the eighteenth century and in the nineteenth
century the law was codified in substantially the whole of the
Roman-law world. But the modern codes assume a background
of the modern Roman law, which is the common law in all the
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jurisdictions in which these codes obtain. Also the technique
of development of code precepts, the technique of application of
the codes, and the technique of judicial decision on the basis
thereof, are the technique of the modern Roman law, derived
from the classical Roman law and developed academically in
the modern world. Hence in the Roman-law world legal edu-
cation is and must be a Roman-law education for the same reason
that with us legal education is and must be a common-law edu-
cation. Also it must be an academic education because the mod-
ern Roman law is a university-made law. Its spirit is the spirit
of the university. Its organs are academic treatises. Its oracles
are academic teachers. The great names in the civil law are not
the names of great judges, or of great advocates. They are the
names of great teachers.
If, then, the method of teaching law in the world of the
modern Roman law is an academic method, by lectures and
study of academic commentaries on authoritative texts, and
of academic doctrinal treatises, it is because the modern Roman
law demands such instruction. It is a university-made law. From
its beginnings in ancient Rome, its technique has been a tech-
nique of developing and applying written texts, and its oracles
have been teachers and academic commentators, not judges.
Those who still in some quarters advocate this method as a
method of legal teaching of our law should reflect upon the
intimate connection between the academic teaching of Roman
law and the traditional technique which is taught thereby. They
should consider how far such a method consists with the genius
of our technique which has a wholly different history and has
been developed by wholly different agencies.
For the common law, our story begins in the thirteenth
century. In that century our law passes definitely into a stage of
strict law, and it reaches its classical era in the seventeenth cen-
tury. In the form which it took in the latter century it was
received as the common law of America. Two points of contrast
with the Roman law are decisive. In the first place, it had few
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or no authoritative texts. There are, it is true, Magna Charta,
and the legislation of Edward I. But there is no complete
authoritative statement. Bracton's treatise, "the crown and
flower of English medieval jurisprudence," was not official and
did not receive legislative sanction, as did the classical Roman
treatises, nor become the subject of commentary. The common
law was the work of the King's justices, sitting in the King's
courts and applying reason to judicial experience, rather than to
juristic or legislative texts. For, in the next place, we must note
that whereas in the classical Roman practice the judge was
appointed for each case pro hac vice, and was not a learned
lawyer, from the thirteenth century at least, the judges of the
King's court are permanent magistrates learned in the law. A
Roman iaudex could not follow his own decisions because he was
not a permanent judge. He would not follow another iudex
because the latter was not a learned lawyer and his opinion
carried no weight. What counted was the opinion of the learned
jurisconsult on which the iudex acted. The common-law judge,
on the other hand, tended to follow his own decisions because he
held a permanent office, and he tended to follow the decisions
of other judges because they were learned lawyers and it was
natural to respect their conclusions. Thus from the outset the
common-law technique becomes one of applying judicial expe-
rience-one of developing the grounds of decision out of the
reported decisions of the past. What may fairly be called
reports of decisions begin in the thirteenth century, and the
doctrine of precedents may be found in the Year Books as early
as the beginning of the fourteenth century.
Meanwhile, agencies of law teaching had been growing up
with the law. In another respect the common law as a system
of law begins with the thirteenth century. For in that century
there was in some sort a secularization of law. The non-clerical
element came to predominate upon the bench, and a profession
of non-clerical lawyers grew up to practice before the non-
clerical judges. Apprentices of law were known already in the
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time of Edward I. How the societies of apprentices grew up we
do not know precisely. Apparently certain masters of law took
pupils, and the groups gradually expanded and became societies.
After the manner of the Middle Ages, they came to be organ-
ized in colleges or corporations, self-perpetuating and self-
governing. The path to the bar and to the bench was through
these societies, not, as on the Continent, through the Univer-
sities. Since they were societies of professional lawyers, and
practice before the courts of the common law was exclusively
in their hands and in the hands of the sergeants, a guild or order
selected from among them by the King, they controlled legal
education by their control of admission to the profession. They
were made up of benchers, the governing body, barristers and
students. And the latter, after a probationary studentship, were
called to the bar by their Inn.
A member of the bar, a "reader" or lecturer, was responsible
during his term for teaching the students. The instruction was
partly in the form of "readings" or lectures, taking the form
of analysis and exposition of a statute or of some section of a
statute. Here we may see Roman influence, through imitation of
the method of the Universities. But statutes were too small a
part of the law for these readings to suffice. And the bulk of the
law, not formulated in written texts, but contained in the re-
ported decisions, or in the tradition of what had been decided,
did not lend itself to analytical and expository lectures in the
scholastic manner. Hence the other form of instruction was by
moots, in which students argued before a bencher and two bar-
risters in the hall of the Inn. These moots were of such impor-
tance that the opinions of learned lawyers sitting in them as
judges are sometimes reported, and some of them are cited as
authority today. The students learned by observing the lawyer
in action in the courts, and by trying their hands in the moots.
It was essentially an apprentice training.
We must remember that the common law was not taught in
the Universities. They taught the Roman law and the canon
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law, but had no professorships of English law until the eigh-
teenth century. They had the training of advocates in the
ecclesiastical courts and in admiralty, but after the sixteenth
century, when for a time it seemed that there might be a recep-
tion of Roman law in England, the training of civilians became
of relatively slight importance. Even today, when the English
Universities are coming to take a much larger part in the profes-
sional training of common-law lawyers, the basis of the instruc-
tion is Roman law, jurisprudence, and a historical and political
introduction to law, followed by a survey of what might be
called the institutes of English law. There is still a gulf
between professional instruction and academic instruction. Nor
is this gulf to be wondered at. For the common law is not an
academic system. From the beginning it has been a law of the
courts as definitely as the modern Roman law, and indeed the
Roman law since the fifth century has been a law of the Univer-
sities. The great names of English law are the names of judges,
not of teachers. Indeed, it used to be that a text book of the
common law was of no persuasive authority and might not be
cited unless written by a judge. Naturally legal education in
England is as characteristically professional as legal education
on the Continent is characteristically academic. In each case
there is a decisive practical reason. For teaching of law is
primarily a teaching of the traditional technique of developing
the legal materials, and of developing grounds of decision of
particular cases therefrom. In England the technique to be
taught is a lawyer's technique of developing and applying the
materials to be found in the law reports, not a teacher's tech-
nique of developing and applying written texts.
Although we received the political institutions of seven-
teenth century England, and in the latter part of the eighteenth
and fore part of the nineteenth century received the English
common law, and although we set up our system of courts on an
English model, there were compelling reasons why the English
method of legal education could not be taken over for America.
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The systematic study which had been maintained in the Inns of
Court almost to the eighteenth century had degenerated in that
century to a few empty forms; and until the middle of the
nineteenth century the real training was by study in the office
of a practitioner, reading, observing, copying precedents and
opinions, and drawing papers. In America we did not preserve
the division of the profession into counsellors and attorneys.
When we received English institutions and English law, the
last remnants of the relationally organized society of the Middle
Ages were thrown over. Craft organization had become obso-
lete, and only a few great companies preserved its memory.
A purely individualist organization of society appealed both to
Puritan and to pioneer. Moreover, the conditions of rural,
agricultural, pioneer society demanded and produced a versa-
tility, a distrust of specialization, and a proneness to allow
every one to demonstrate freely what he could do, that made
organization of the profession in self-governing societies after
the English model impossible. Immediately after the Revolu-
tion, law and lawyers were in much disfavor; the law because
it could not escape the odium of its English origin in the period
of bitter feelings after the war, lawyers because they alone seem-
ed to thrive in the economic disorganization and disturbed con-
ditions that followed peace. These circumstances and the radical
democratic notions of the Jeffersonian era determined our
professional organization.
Another reason operated also to shape our organization of
the bar, and to give character to our legal education. In England
the courts were centralized at Westminster. Hence, the bar was
centralized at the Inns of Court. But with us, in a country of
long distances and expensive travel, central courts entailed an
intolerable expense upon litigants. We decentralized the courts
of general jurisdiction at law and in equity, almost from the
start, and sought to set up a judicial organization that should
bring justice to every man's back door. This decentralizing
of the judicial system involved a decentralizing of the bar. As
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each of the old common-law courts had its roll of attorneys, so
each local court of general jurisdiction had its own bar. There
could be no such centralized system of admission to practice,
and consequent centralized control of legal education, as the
control of admission by the Inns of Court made possible in
England.
While all these things were making for the system of
reading in the office of a local practitioner, which obtained in
this country until within a generation, another force was acting
to promote the academic professional training which is now
characteristically American.
We received English law at the end of the eighteenth and in
the fore part of the nineteenth century. But we could not
receive it exactly as it stood in the English books. We had
many things to be provided for which English legislation and
English judges had never been called upon to consider. Much
in English law was devised for social and political and economic
conditions quite different from ours. Our courts were con-
strained to work out somewhat rapidly a system of legal pre-
cepts adapted to a new and growing country upon the basis of
the somewhat stagnant English legal tradition at the end of the
eighteenth century. For half a century at least our chief concern
was to work out an American common law-to develop a
system of certain and detailed legal precepts which should meet
the requirements of American life. Apprentice trained lawyers,
knowing only the traditional technique as the practitioners had
learned it in the courts, could not rise to the exigencies of this
demand. Indeed, two things quite un-English, natural law and
comparative law, played leading roles in the evolution of an
American law, and for these, so far as they were made effective
agencies of shaping our legal development and directing the
growth of our law, we had to look to teachers.
Our first law schools, indeed, were but practitioners' offices.
Certainly in the case of the first school of the common law in
America, the one conducted at Litchfield, Connecticut, by Judge
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Reeve, there was a transition from law office to law school with
no definite dividing line. As there were more students than in
an office, the talks of the preceptor with the student turned into
dictated lectures, but the spirit and method were those of an
office apprenticeship.
On the other hand, the example of the Vinerian Professor-
ship at Oxford and of Blackstone's lectures suggested a different
method. That example was followed eagerly in the years when
American law was formative. Wythe was professor at William
and Mary in 1779-1780. James Wilson was professor at the
College of Philadelphia in 1790-1791. Kent was professor at
Columbia from 1793 to 1798. Isaac Parker became Royall pro-
fessor at Harvard in 1815. But the general lectures which they
delivered to academic audiences did no more than prepare the
way. When the Harvard Law School was established in 1817
it was essentially a school of the Litchfield type; it afforded an
improved method of study under a preceptor in a law office.
It was not until the appointment of Joseph Story as Dane pro-
fessor at Harvard that academic lectures and professional train-
ing under the direction of a common-law lawyer were brought
into one system. Story was a common-law lawyer, and the tra-
ditions of English legal teaching insured that an Anglo-Ameri-
can academic law school under his guidance would be a profes-
sional school. But the philosophical ideas of the time in which
Story had been trained insured that a school over which he
presided would be a school of law, not a lawyer's office teaching
rules of thumb. Also Story's zealous exposition of the doctrines
of English law in the light of a natural-law philosophy and of
comparative law, enabled the school in which he taught to re-
main a school devoted to the common law. From Story and
Greenleaf to Parker and Parsons and Washburn, thence to
Langdell and Ames, and thence to the American law schools of
today, is a continuous evolution. It has given us a system of
academic professional instruction that is as characteristically
American as our American common law itself. It has given us
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a system of legal education that grows out of and expresses the
spirit of our law as completely as the Continental system ex-
presses the spirit of the modern Roman law, and as the English
system expresses the spirit of the medieval common law. For if
the modern Roman law is jurist-made, and English law is
court-made, American law has been made by courts guided and
inspired by jurists who worked scientifically upon a proved
body of judicial experience in the administration of justice.
Thus there are two elements in our technique as distinctly as
there is but one element in the technique of the civilian and but
one in the technique of the classical common law. Moreover, in
the interpretation and application of constitutions we have had
the same problem of developing a body of law from enduring
texts, to which the academic legal science of the civilians has
been addressed for centuries. Here also judges and teachers
have each had a part. Along with the decisions of Marshall, the
teaching of Story and of Cooley has given content to abstract
formulas and determined the technique of constitutional inter-
pretation which has become a distinctive feature of our law.
In the law school of a state university the American system
of academic professional legal education cannot but be especially
fruitful. A study of the local legal institutions and of the local
law from a universal standpoint is made more effective through
a close relation between the law school of the state and the
organized bar of the state. There is no gulf between academic
teaching of law and the law of the tribunals. Each reacts upon
and corrects the other. Likewise, where bench and bar are
trained for the most part in the law school of the state univer-
sity, the loyalty of the almuni which is the mainstay of American
institutions of learning, must make of the law school a center of
professional life such as we have never had in our decentralized
judicial and professional organizations. Thus the sane measur-
ing of what is by what ought to be, the intelligent testing of
theories by the exigencies of concrete controversies, and the
critique of judicial pronouncements with reference to rational
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principles, which have become the mark of our academic law
schools, may come to be a part of the intellectual life of the
whole profession.
But the University has not done all that needs to be done
for American law when it has provided the best training in the
law for well-trained students and has stimulated research to
make the legal system of the time and place respond to the
needs of the social order in which it is to govern. More than
lawyers well trained in the law is needed, if the judicial process
is to be at its best. The work of the courts calls for judges aided
by lawyers, and that means lawyers imbued with the spirit and
raised in the traditions of a profession. Unhappily, in our
formative era we went far to deprofessionalize the lawyer and to
this we owe most of the abuses which too often disfigure the
proceedings in our courts. The process of rebuilding has been
going on for two generations. But it has been a painful one
and has had to contend with conditions in metropolitan cities
which make for an atmosphere of business competition rather
than for one of professional emulation. In its time the appren-
tice training kept alive the professional ideal in spite of de-
professionalizing forces. Law students were brought up to
feel themselves part of a body of men pursuing a common
calling as a learned art and in the spirit of a public service-no
less a public service because it was incidentally a means of
livelihood. They were brought up to be thoroughly aware of
obligations to clients, to courts, to the public and to the profes-
sion, neglect of any of which simply was unthinkable. With the
decadence of the apprentice training, inevitable under the con-
ditions of practice in the present century, this, which was its
best feature, has been lost sight of or has been but feebly
provided for. If the University is to do the whole of the task
which has devolved upon it because of its replacing the law
office in legal education, it must learn how to replace the appren-
tice training on the side of training in the profession as well as
training in the law.
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This task is not to be achieved by formal courses in legal
ethics or in the history of the profession, much less by lectures
on the moral obligations of the lawyer. Such things are likely to
do no more than give opportunities to crammers for bar exam-
inations, or fill student note books. They are not matters for
courses nor for mere reading. They require contact with the
leaders of the profession or with teachers conscious of what the
profession is and what its professional traditions mean for the
law and for administration of justice according to law. They
are matters of the atmosphere of teaching and study. It is a gain
that the American university law school has put legal education
in an atmosphere of culture and scholarship. It is a loss that it
has broken the continuity of the professional tradition, the tra-
dition of what is done and what is not done by the good lawyer,
a tradition handed down from lawyer to apprentice almost from
the beginnings of our law.
I am not here with a paper program for meeting this demand
which we must make upon our University law schools. The
first step is to bring it home to our law schools that they have
such a task. Very likely there will prove to be more than one
way of performing it. Very likely a certain amount of trial and
error will be necessary before our schools learn what they can
do most effectively toward maintaining, furthering and trans-
mitting a true professional tradition, felt as such, not merely
learned for the purposes of an examination and then forgotten.
In a complete program of making American administration
of justice what it should be in the twentieth century, a full
reprofessionalizing of the lawyers is not the least item, nor is it
the least item in what the Universities have undertaken now that
they have definitely and fully taken over the training of the
American lawyer.
